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Resumo
Quando Hélio Jaguaribe publicou seu livro “O 
nacionalismo na atualidade brasileira”, seu impacto 
na comunidade epistêmica desenvolvimentista foi 
imediato. Em particular, entre os nacionalistas que 
defendiam arduamente o monopólio da exploração 
petrolífera da Petrobras, concedido em 1953, a 
reação foi de espanto e indignação. Neste artigo 
argumenta-se que na realidade Jaguaribe não 
buscou questionar a adequação do monopólio, 
mas sim posicionar o debate sobre a questão 
petrolífera em bases mais racionais e pragmáticas. 
À contribuição pioneira de Jaguaribe seguir-se-ia 
um rico debate intelectual de algumas décadas entre 
sociólogos, cientistas políticos e economistas acerca 
do significado da questão petrolífera brasileira e 
sobre a importância da fundação da Petrobras em 
1953 para o desenvolvimento econômico do país 
e para sua independência política e econômica. O 
artigo também mostra que em vários momentos de 
sua carreira Jaguaribe voltaria à questão petrolífera, 
ressaltando de forma lúcida e pragmática, e, acima 
de tudo, imbuído de um espírito desenvolvimentista, 
os desafios que se punham e possíveis soluções.
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Abstract
When Helio Jaguaribe published his book “O na-
cionalismo na atualidade brasileira” (Nationalism 
in Brazil Today), its impact in Brazil´s developmen-
tal epistemic community was immediate. Among 
the nationalists who strongly advocated the 1953 
Petrobras oil monopoly, the reaction was one of 
astonishment and outrage. In this article, it is ar-
gued that Jaguaribe did not seek to question the 
adequacy of the monopoly solution, but rather to 
frame the debate about the oil question on a more 
rational and pragmatic basis. Jaguaribe’s pioneer-
ing contribution would be followed by a rich intel-
lectual debate of some decades between sociolo-
gists, political scientists, and economists about the 
significance of the Brazilian oil issue and the im-
portance of the foundation of Petrobras in 1953 for 
economic development and Brazil´s affirmation in 
its quest for economic and political independence. 
The article also shows that at various times of his 
career Jaguaribe would return to the oil question, 
emphasizing in a lucid and pragmatic way, and, 
above all, imbued with a developmental spirit, its 
challenges, and possible solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1958, when Helio Jaguaribe published his “O nacionalismo na atualidade 
brasileira” (Nationalism in Brazil Today) (Jaguaribe 1958), the Brazilian 
developmental debate was still in full swing. Although Petrobras had been 
founded in 1953, giving a more nationalistic solution to the Brazilian oil 
question, and, despite the already felt success of the diverse attempts to 
plan Brazil´s economic development, some very pressing issues had not 
been entirely answered. How would the development and expansion of 
the Brazilian electricity sector take place, with a state-owned company 
that coordinates the expansion, or with public and/or private companies 
performing such a function? What would be the role of international private 
capital in promoting Brazilian development? Would this sector assume the 
responsibility of steering the rise of the durable goods sector, or would 
national capitalists have the financial breath and technological capabilities 
to achieve higher flights?
In his national-bourgeois interpretation of the Brazilian economic 
development process, Hélio Jaguaribe had an arsenal of answers to these 
questions. For Jaguaribe, considered ISEB´s main theoretical formulator 
and also its most reputed political scientist,  it was clear that the most 
appropriate model for advancing Brazil´s development after 1930 would 
bea nationalistic brand of capitalism” (BRESSER PEREIRA, 1997, p. 20). 
In this development project, a class of entrepreneurs from the national 
bourgeoisie, which “would be nationalist, industrializing, modern and 
socially progressive, would have a leading role, but would be “captained 
by the state, which emerges as the coordinator of the entire economy” 
(MANTEGA, 1991, p. 60). Nevertheless, in analyzing the resolution of the 
Brazilian oil question, with the foundation of Petrobras in 1953, Jaguaribe 
concludes that the monopoly solution would require that the nation would 
not give up foreign capital in other sectors of the economy, due to a scarcity 
of resources. This position, considered overtly pragmatic what concerns the 
issue of foreign capital by the most radical nationalists, leads to Jaguaribe´s 
and his associates´ resignation from ISEB (SMITH, 1976)
In this article, it is argued that while Jaguaribe’s interpretation of the 
Petrobras foundation contains some misconceptions, it has the undeniable 
merit of having placed the debate on Brazil´s oil question on a much more 
pragmatic and realistic base. Moreover, it is shown that Jaguaribe was the 
main forerunner of a series of high quality and more rigorous academic 
interpretations about this question. The article also reviews Jaguaribe´s 
other contribution to the oil problematic (1974; 1977; 1989), considering 
their historical context.
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section describes 
the resolution of the Brazilian oil question, which would culminate in a 
nationalist solution, with Petrobras the founding of Petrobras in 1953. 
The second section analyzes the pioneering contribution of Jaguaribe 
to understanding the importance of this issue and reviews the other 
contributions that followed in the debate. Finally, the third and last section 
reviews Jaguaribe´s other contributions to the oil subject considering their 
historic meaning. 
THE SETTLING OF THE OIL QUESTION IN BRAZIL
After taking office for a second term (1951-1954), Getulio Vargas was 
determined to find an answer for Brazil´s oil question. A postwar nationalist 
campaign (1948-49), “O Petróleo é Nosso!” (Petroleum is ours!”), had put 
that issue in the center of Brazil´s policymaking agenda, leading Vargas to 
include the state monopoly in the field of petroleum in his political platform 
of the 1950 election. That campaign was a reaction to an attempt by Dutra´s 
administration (1946-1950) to loosen nationalist oil control, a move that 
was perceived as a threat to Brazil´s industrialization (SMITH, 1976, 
p. 163). With it, the security arguments against majors had gained traction in 
military ranks. Drawing on General Horta´s views, most of the officer corps 
were convinced to “drop its brief flirtation with economic liberalism with 
respect to oil”. (WIRTH, 1985, p. 134-135).  
In order to encounter a viable solution for the oil question, Vargas setup 
the President´s Economic Assessorship, composed, among others, by Rômulo 
de Almeida and Jesus Soares Pereira (CANO, 2015, p. 444). One of its most 
important tasks was to formulate a proposal to settle Brazil´s oil question. 
As Jaguaribe explains, although the Assessorship lacked an administrative 
machinery which had been made available for the Joint Brazil-United States 
Economic Development Commission, it produced “a no less far-reaching 
program for the country´s economic development” (JAGUARIBE, 1968, 
p. 147). Vargas submitted the “petroleum plan” (JAGUARIBE, 1968, p. 
147) the Assessorship had produced to Congress in 1951. It was considered 
a moderate proposal, for it provided for a 51 percent government-owned 
holding company, and for oil development and refining in which private 
capital could have a large role in subsidiaries and associated enterprises 
(RANDALL, 1993, p. 9). 
A debate that was both public and political, in congress, ensued after 
Vargas´ proposal. On one hand, “entreguistas” claimed that  Brazil would 
not develop its petroleum industry without foreign capitals. Some, like 
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Odilon Braga, attempted to convince nationalists that without political 
support from the United States for the oil matter, Brazil would not be able 
to control the IOCs´ advances and would not be able to resist “abuse (...) of 
an imperialist character” (COHN, 1968: 116). In the second half of 1951, 
Standard Oil itself advised the President (VICTOR, 1970, p. 297) that:
“for the industrialization of oil in Brazil to be successfully accomplished, there 
is a need for a climate that favors competition and free initiative. (…) This (…) 
[law project currently under discussion] (…) [rules out] the participation of for-
eign capital in this industry and [the establishment] of a favorable [business] 
climate.”
By his turn, the liberal economist Otavio Bulhões (1952), discussed the 
pertinence of setting up barriers for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the petroleum industry, which he believed were a form of prejudice against 
foreign capitalist. He also argued that FDI in that industry could enhance 
the country´s overall welfare. Similarly, Juarez Távora contended that it was 
preferable to develop the oil industry with the aid of foreign capital and to 
gradually control and nationalize it. He believed that foreign firms would do 
a better job of exploiting oil and that the discovery of cheap and abundant 
oil by foreign companies would benefit the economy and compensate for 
the remittance abroad of income earned by foreign firms (TAVORA, 1955).
In fact, Vargas himself did not rule out the participation of foreign 
capital in the oil industry. In that context, Rômulo de Almeida defended 
the participation of foreign capital in the oil business in a congress hearing:
“In the project, what is intended, obeying to nationalist principles, is not to give 
concessions to foreigners, but to allow Brazilian juridical persons, with the par-
ticipation of some foreign elements, to become partners of a state organization 
that is under perfect control of the State. (…) In my view, the identification of 
the state monopoly with one hundred percent state organization is inadequate. 
What does state monopoly mean? The State, through any of the organizations it 
disposes of and manages, is the sole concessionaire of the industry,  (VICTOR, 
1970, p. 321).”
On the other side of the political debate stood those who believed that 
oil should be an activity exclusively carried out by the state, which had 
been defended by the “O Petroleo é Nosso!” campaigners. That campaign 
eventually succeeded in cohering the views of different factions from the 
nationalist coalition, and some that formerly were outside it. Even Oswaldo 
Aranha, who had been an “entreguista”, claimed that “there is only one 
conclusion (…) To the State and only to the State belongs the role of 
exploiting this wealth” (COHN, 1968, p. 170). Similarly, a military, General 
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Arthur Levy, had summarized the nationalist sentiment that eventually 
would lead to the formation of Petrobras (LEVY, 1962, p. 25): “Energy is 
the motor of development and it is the heart of the national organism and 
therefore should be Brazilian. (...) No one lives with a borrowed heart!!”. In 
a context of political pressures, Vargas also joined the nationalist camp.
After three years of heated debate, the legislation that was eventually 
approved was radical, establishing a state monopoly which comprised 
all activities related to oil, with the exception of the distribution of oil 
products, an activity that already had been conducted by private enterprise, 
subsidiaries of the large international corporations, since the early 20th 
century. Petrobras, which was founded in 1953 as a mixed-economy state 
company, was assigned by the law Number 2004, from October 3, 1953, the 
task of carrying out monopolistic activities in the realm of petroleum and 
gas Exploration & Production and the refining of oil (DIAS LEITE, 2009, 
p. 11). Petrobras was designed “as a well-capitalized, financially independent 
company”, which led imports of refined products to fall considerably in the 
1950s (WIRTH, 1985, pp. 137-138). As noted by Villela (1962, pp. 112-3), 
in the first years of its operation, Petrobras and other state companies 
received massive subsidies from the Federal Government, to finance the 
company´s investments. With this, those corporation´s capital formation 
was considerably high. However, because nationalists feared foreign capital, 
the creation of subsidiaries was discouraged, which lead to a reduction of 
the resources that could have accelerated Petrobras´ process of vertical 
integration (CARVALHO, 1975, p. 17). Nonetheless, from the mid-1950s 
onwards, of all state enterprises controlled by the state, Petrobras was by far 
the most important, as it “gave the state a powerful lever with which to shape 
and direct the process of accumulation” (EVANS, 1979, pp. 91-2).
AN INTELLECTUAL DEBATE
Some years after a solution to the oil question in Brazil had been found, a 
debate about the pertinence of that solution continued to occur. One of the 
mains reasons for this was that, in the first years of its operation, Petrobras´ 
exploratory results were disappointing. Petrobras targeted producing a daily 
output of 100,000 barrels of crude oil and refining 308,000 barrels per day 
in 1960 (JAGUARIBE, 1968, p. 154-5). By that year, it managed to increase 
its production to 75,000 barrels per day (75,5 percent of the target) and 
to expand to 218,600 barrels per day its refining capacity (71 percent of 
target) (ibid). In the context of poor exploratory results, the publication of 
Walter Link´s report, who concluded that the existence of large oil reserves 
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on Brazilian territory was improbable (PHILIP, 1982, p. 370), led to a 
momentary loss of direction, and it took some years before new directives 
could be established as to continue exploration on land (DIAS LEITE, 2009, 
p. 13). In that vein, the decision about whether foreign investment should 
be permitted to find for oil in Brazil was not entirely closed in the late 1950s, 
even though Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961) eventually discovered that 
it was valuable to assert his commitment to nationalism. In parallel, the US 
government continued its diplomatic pressures to allow foreign companies 
to explore oil in Brazil, such that the matter continue to be discussed in the 
Brazilian policymaking circle (PHILIP, 1982, p. 371-2).
The pertinency of Petrobras´ exploration monopoly was also debated by 
Brasil´s intellectuals also debated the pertinency of Petrobras´exploration 
monopoly.  The liberal economist Roberto Campos, for instance, attacks the 
state monopoly in the petroleum industry and pleads for the liberalization 
of the 1953 Petroleum law in a conference during the 1950s, that was later 
republished in Campos (1964). In this work, Campos is concerned with 
the exchange rate crisis Brazil was then facing, and he believed that the 
attraction of foreign investments to the domestic petroleum industry could 
lead to a “radical and sudden elimination of our current balance of payments 
problems” (CAMPOS, 1964, p. 125). Campos also warned that Petrobras´ 
decision to construct refineries and oil tankers was a dubious blessing for the 
country. In his view, although this could permit to save foreign currency in 
the long run, the incentive that this decision would give to industrialization 
would create more demand for foreign exchange in the short term, making 
the pressing balance of payments problem even worse.
Although Jaguaribe´s (1958) contribution to this debate was not the first 
one, he was the first who presented a more technical and intellectual rigorous 
interpretation of the settling of Brazil´s oil question and its historical, 
economic and political importance. Moreover, due to its reception, it 
had probably the most far-reaching consequences, because it was the first 
one with a genuine developmentalist perspective, having attracted much 
attention from his peers.
In his book “Nationalism in Brazil Today” Helio Jaguaribe (1958) 
compared and juxtaposed in a rigorous analytical approach, in a stylized way, 
the two possible solutions that were available to solve Brazil´s oil question. 
On one hand, he the presented the nationalist solution, which, in his words, 
aimed at “making Brazil a historical individuality, assuming the risks and 
paying the price of this decision” (JAGUARIBE, 1958, p.143). On the other 
stood the solution presented by the advocates of “a cosmopolitan thesis”, 
whose preference laid in the “colonial situation” (IBID). In his comparison, 
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Jaguaribe parts from the premise that in the petroleum industry – which 
requires the use of specialized technology, that is constantly progressing 
forward and that must compete for the international supply and demand 
of factors – foreign capital has an inherent advantage when the question 
is considered solely in terms of economic efficiency (JAGUARIBE, 1958, 
p. 143). However, the nationalist thesis also has its validity in this sector of 
the economy because development is “a global social process, not just an 
economic one” (IBID). Jaguaribe argued that after systematic confrontation, 
both sides would tend to mutually neutralize each other. He thus argued that 
an unambiguous decision in favor of one them based on a purely rational 
analysis was difficult to achieve (COHN, p. 181).  Jaguaribe thus contends 
that:
“By proposing to consolidate the nation as its ultimate political goal, the com-
munity is confronted with the choice of sectors or activities in which it will most 
radically engage itself in its purpose of self-determination. (…) What is at issue 
is the assumption of one’s own freedom, of creating the nation as the center of 
its own decisions. (…) The choice of sectors or activities in which this struggle 
for the affirmation of freedom occurs is something that can be done with greater 
or lesser reasonableness. (…)  In the Brazilian case, the chosen sector (…) must 
necessarily be economic because it is in this area that the greatest obstacles to 
our development lie. This was done by the Brazilian community, after a broad 
and democratic discussion in which all participated, and the sector elected by it 
to fight the struggle for its freedom was oil. (...) The petroleum sector was the 
chosen one partly for entirely rational reasons, partly because of a dramatic act 
of arbitrariness. (…)” (JAGUARIBE, 1958, pp. 145-146)
Whilst resolving this dilemma, the country had to face a trade-off. If on 
one hand, the state monopoly favors an increase in the country’s economic 
independence, on the other, it implies the elimination of the most efficient 
form of allocating investments from the point of view of economic rationality 
(COHN, 1968, p. 181). Having chosen the nationalistic monopoly solution, 
Jaguaribe advised that Brazil would have to bear the costs of its economic-
political freedom. This would require from the country an increase in its 
national savings and the acceptance of the participation of foreign capital 
in more advanced sectors of the economy (JAGUARIBE, 1958, pp. 146-7)
As Souza (2009, p. 163-4) explains, members of the ISEB had the habit of 
presenting their studies to the other members´s criticism before publication. 
When this was done with the first part of Jaguaribe´s book, it was considered 
“heretical” by the nationalist sectors, mostly because they interpreted that 
Jaguaribe was defending the participation of foreign capital in the economy 
(SOUZA, 2010, p. 163-4). At that time, the question of the Brazilian 
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state oil monopoly was inseparably tied to the nationalist issue, which 
led some students, sectors of the press and public opinion even to believe 
that Hélio Jaguaribe was cooperating with Standard Oil (IBID). By then, 
even though foreign investment had an important role in Brazil´s process 
of industrialization, there was a fierce controversy about how much foreign 
capital should be accepted (SANTORO, 2008, pp. 12-13). The publication 
of his 1958 treatise on the petroleum question and the state monopoly thus 
led to Jaguaribe´s departure and from his more conservative colleagues from 
ISEB (CHILCOTE, 2014), even though he had been clearly misunderstood. 
In the decades that followed, several of high-quality contributions and 
valuable contributions – by political scientists, economists, and sociologists 
– sought to analyze both the mechanism that led to the settling of Brazil´s 
oil question in 1953 and its historical, political and economic significance. 
Some of them were clearly inspired by Jaguaribe´s contribution or attempted 
a response to him.
One such contribution was given by the structuralist economist Celso 
Furtado, who, like Jaguaribe, also identifies an acute conflict between two 
rivaling ideological groups for the case of oil. He identifies one line of 
thought that was committed to “the old export economy” (FURTADO, 
1961, p. 215), for which the domestic scarcity of resources was a reason not 
to channel scarce resources into an uncertain sector such as petroleum, were 
foreign capital was abundantly available. Also, like Jaguaribe, Furtado argues 
that the developmental strand does not handle the petroleum question in 
strictly economic terms. That strand was concerned with the defense “of the 
newly acquired dominance of its decision-making center” and was wary that 
the international petroleum companies´ interests would be difficult to cohere 
with the ones from the nation. (FURTADO, 1961, p. 215). For Furtado, the 
synchrony between developmental interests and decisions was fundamental 
to overcome the phase when Brazil was a reflex economy, thus requiring an 
individualization of the country´s economic system. Furtado hence regards 
the state as the economy´s main decision-making center and attributes it 
with the task of coordinating the process of development.
Sylvio Monteiro, an economist who was a member of ISEB during its 
second and explicitly more radical phase – that lasted from 1960 to 1964 
– (BRINGEL, 2018), also deals with the issue of petroleum in his 1963 
“How does Yankee imperialism work?” (MONTEIRO, 1963). Bringel 
(2018) suggests that this book is a response to Jaguaribe (1958), even 
though the author does not cite him directly. In Monteiro´s view, ´yankee 
imperialism´ was to blame for the lack of oil exploitation in the country as 
it has succeeded “in preventing any oil exploration and processing initiative 
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from being carried out in our country, thereby maintaining it as a market for 
its products and at the same time reserving for itself” (MONTEIRO,  1963, 
p. 109). Furthermore, for Monteiro oil majors never demonstrated much 
interest in exploring oil or investing in the refining business in Brazil. (IBID). 
In his view, then, Petrobras´ foundation would be a bold answer to the claims 
of US imperialism, and would also represent “a victory of the Brazilian 
people for its economic emancipation” (IBID, pp.110, 113). Nevertheless, 
in Monteiro´s view Brazil´s oil question had not been settled yet, because 
the country´s state oil monopoly would still be under the siege of its internal 
and external enemies. Monteiro highlighted as a particularly worrisome 
threat “the insemination, within the key organs of the state, of a pessimistic 
mentality of discouragement” (IBID, p. 113) regarding Petrobras´ prospects 
of finding oil in the country´s sedimentary basins. As the country would be 
“facing a great struggle for the conquest of Brazilian oil”, Monteiro calls 
upon “our people in general, the workers, the students and all the other 
workers to unite” (IBID, p. 122).
With a much more moderate tone than Monteiro, the engineer and 
economist Antonio Dias Leite (DIAS LEITE, 1966) welcomed the existence 
of public enterprises such as Petrobras in what he called the country´s 
“nucleus of economic expansion” (SINGER, 1976, p. 158).  For the author, 
activities belonging to that core “should have their expansion accelerated as to 
avoid them becoming an obstacle to the overall development of the country” 
(DIAS LEITE, 1966, p. 36). Dias Leite believed that “the success or failure 
to meet the accelerated expansion goal of these industries has largely defined 
the country’s overall development pace” (IBID). As Singer explains, Leite 
defends the “primacy of national capital vis-à-vis multinational companies 
and required the State to play an active role in the promotion of growth” 
(SINGER, 1976, p. 158). In the realm of the petroleum industry, which 
he regarded as paramount for the achievement of economic development, 
Dias Leite highlighted the importance of capital accumulation and of 
investments in exploration and development for the overall performance 
of the economy.  Dias Leite, however, did not rule the participation of 
private national and private foreign capitals as sources of funding for the 
expansion of the petroleum industry. What regards the possible inefficiency 
of public enterprises such as Petrobras, Dias Leite contended that it could be 
minimized through a targeted program to achieve efficiency, be it through 
training programs or through the establishment of a system that incentivized 
workers´ participation in the company´s results, “conditioned to the 
improvement of sectoral and global efficiency.” (DIAS LEITE, 1966, p. 53).
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Some years later the sociologist Gabriel Cohn also presented his 
contribution to the oil question debate (COHN, 1968). While emphatically 
criticizing Jaguaribe´s approach, he proposes an explanation for the process 
leading to Petrobras´ foundation, which he calls the Dynamics of the 
situation. According to that interpretation, the outcome of the process, 
namely the petroleum policy of 1953, was not the result of some carefully 
architected plan or the outcome of a Socratic dialogue between rivalling 
conceptions that could be rationally confronted, as he interpreted that 
Jaguaribe had argued before. In Cohn´s view, the decision to create Petrobras 
was not “derived from the crystallization of a collective will.” (COHN, 1968, 
p. 182). For him, the  oil policy in the form that it emerged in 1953 “was 
imposed as a requirement of a material order” on whose definition hinged 
the very continuity of the Brazilian developmental process (IBID, p. 183). 
Cohn believes that, in general, no social group had had a decisive influence 
on the institution of the state oil monopoly in Brazil, as there was “a complex 
interaction between [interest] groups, (….) prompted and stimulated by 
pressing problems to sustain the global process of change that was taking 
place at all levels of national society” (IBID). For him, under a different set 
of circumstances another solution could have been found, as was the case in 
other Latin American countries. Hence, it was the “dynamics of the situation 
[that had] led to this [particular] decision, and not another one” (IBID). For 
Cohn, however, the dynamics of the situation could be distinguished from 
mere chance:
“this constellation of options was neither causal nor unlimited; on the contrary, 
it was limited and structured. Given the greater problem of the oil policy, its 
solution was imposed. (…) In these historical conditions, a certain number of 
options, limited in function of the social groups in presence, presented itself; 
(…). (..) What is sought to show, then, is the progressive narrowing of this field 
of decision-making possibilities, by virtue of the successive redefinition of its 
historical determinants, until the final solution adopted is reached (…)” (IBID, 
pp. 185-6)”
Nonetheless, Cohn particularizes a specific force that led to the solution 
adopted, which was the agency, in critical junctures, “of influential agents, 
capable of articulating the various aspects of the problem as they presented 
themselves at a given moment” (IBID). For Cohn, “in 1938, this synthesis 
was made by the military – under the leadership of Horta Barbosa; in 1951-
53, by the parliamentary opposition, which included representatives of the 
Petroleum Campaign and the UDN” (IBID). 
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In quite an opposite direction, the liberal economist Eugenio Gudin 
attacked the nationalist petroleum policy in a series of articles written in the 
mid-1960s, which were republished in 1969 (GUDIN, 1969). For instance, 
he criticized the import substitution industrialization (ISI) type of policy 
that had led to Petrobras´ creation: “it is not possible to explain to people 
that industrialization was done to make goods and products not cheaper, 
but more expensive. Industry is not intended to enrich the industrialists 
but to enrich the nation” (GUDIN, 1969, p. 413). The author, who 
believed that the cost paid by the Brazilian people of financing Petrobras 
was too high, defended that foreign investments in that field should not 
be ruled out, as foreign capital and its technology had made possible the 
construction of Brazil´s first large hydroelectric plants, that eventually 
were owned by Brazilian state companies. He also attacks Brazil´s absurd 
“nationalistic complex of some of our ruling classes”, which he classifies as 
being “xenophobic” (GUDIN, 1969, p. 428).
By his turn, the sociologist Octaviani Ianni (1971, pp. 127-8) argues that 
Petrobras’ creation was a critical milestone in the creation of Brazil’s state 
apparatus. According to the author, all the studies and debates carried out 
within the executive branch’s sphere to find a solution for the petroleum 
question attempted to attend to the demands and interests of local and foreign 
capitalists, the military, economists, and politicians, in the political context 
of a democratic regime. Nonetheless, these actors had a preoccupation in 
achieving a compromise between that was necessary in economic, political, 
and technical terms, and that what was possible. Thus, Petrobras’s foundation 
was a revelation of the executive’s style of action and thinking, one in which 
consensus-building between the interests at play was permanently sought 
for. This thinking style underlies the creation, perfection, and development 
of an efficient government bureaucracy and state technostructure. Although 
Petrobras’ initial technostructure was poorly developed and lacked structure, 
this was an essential experience in improving and increasing the Brazilian 
State’s size. Thus, Petrobras’ success created increasing returns for the policy 
traction of a national-developmental economic ideology that favored making 
even more stringent policy experiments with state-led industrialization.
Some years later, the liberal economist Campos would return to the oil 
question in his notorious work on the Brazilian developmental model of the 
military dictatorship, which he co-authored with Mario Henrique Simonsen 
(CAMPOS & SIMONSEN, 1974). Campos was an ardent defender of 
Petrobras´ investments abroad – particularly in Bolivia (Campos, 1963 – 
and one of the main articulators of risk contracts in his role as Brazilian 
ambassador to the United Kingdom (see KUCINSKY, 1977, p. 58). In this 
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work, Campos would argue that one of the most pressing “controversies” 
of the time – the nationalistic question – had been solved, in the case of 
petroleum, as Petrobras, in the aftermath of the “1964 Revolution, [was 
now] guided by industrial and pragmatic criteria, without political and 
ideological concerns, which, at different times in the past, have disrupted 
the company’s efficiency” (CAMPOS & SIMONSEN, 1974, p. 74). As 
proofs of this pragmatist turn, Campos identifies two openings to the 
private sector – one “oriented towards associations with foreign companies 
to explore oil abroad and within the country” and Petrobras´ decision to take 
“a minority stake in petrochemical companies, in association with national 
and foreign firms” (IBID). Campos, who in the 1950s had participated in 
the Joint Brazil – United States Technical Commission and was aware that 
the take-off of Brazil´s economic development had to be carefully planned 
by the state (which included the foundation of state companies in the realm 
of energy such as Petrobras), however disfavored the monopolistic solution 
in the realm of petroleum and gas exploration and production, as he was 
also oriented by a very pragmatist stance. Thus, if Campos at the very 
minimum tolerated Petrobras´ creation for its potential role as remover of 
growth strangling points – albeit in association with foreign companies –, 
he envisioned its future role much more as a modern and efficient enterprise 
than as a burocratized state capitalist venture. 
The political scientist Getúlio Carvalho, by his turn, interprets the state´s 
pioneering activity in the petroleum industry as “the creative response to the 
Brazilian oil crisis” (CARVALHO, 1977, p. 92), in analogy to Schumpeter´s 
concept of creative destruction (see SCHUMPETER, 1912). Whereas 
Schumpeter relates the rise of capitalism to the heroic agency of individual 
entrepreneurs, Carvalho argues that it was the state, and not Brazil´s capitalist 
class, that took the pioneering initiative to kickstart the impressive ascent 
of Brazil´s petroleum industry. Brazilian capitalists, Carvalho argues, “were 
happy to receive benefits from the government, such as political support, 
tax exemptions, and tariff protection (…) but refused to see any merit in the 
government´s initiative”, even though they themselves clearly lacked the 
interest in performing the heavy investments that the petroleum industry 
required (IBID). For Carvalho, then, the hostility faced by Petrobras in its 
initial stage of institutionalization can be explained in the light of a lack of a 
consensus about what should be the role of the state in the economy (IBID). 
According to the author, the opposition to Petrobras was mostly of an 
ideological nature, because the creation of Petrobras was not part of a socialist 
program of any kind, as it solely aimed at resolving a very specific problem, 
which was the lack of both foreign and private domestic capitals to build an 
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industry with the size required by Brazil´s then booming industrialization 
process (IBID,  p. 93).
Some years later, the sociologist Luciano Martins (1985) identifies in 
Petrobras foundation an ideology of state intervention. As he describes it, 
“statism, nationalism, or developmentalism (…) often appeared as confused 
as interchangeable concepts, to the extent that they were perceived as 
instrumental to a nation’s development project, served to politically justify 
the existence of state enterprise and the role played by its administrators” 
(MARTINS, 1985, pp. 59-60). According to the author´s interpretation, the 
state’s business action did not arise accidentally, as if it were disconnected 
from a well-defined political project, but rather after a long political debate. 
For Martins, that debate gave Petrobras the political legitimacy it required, as 
the state company´s initial success depended on “an allocation of resources, 
based on forced savings, which had to be politically justified, given the system 
of representation of interests (IBID, p. 60).
Another author, the political scientist and economist Carmen Alveal 
(1994, p. 73) shows that different political and economic initial conditions 
favored a faster solution for Brazil´s oil question, where “the decisive aspect 
that favored the sharpness and consequent political victory of the state 
option in the case of petroleum refers to the lack of any corporate structure 
of a certain relevance, public or private, national or foreign, implanted in 
the activities that constituted Petrobras´ monopoly”. In contrast, Eletrobras 
was founded in a context of an already existing institutional framework 
and of a consolidated sectorial productive structure, with the felt presence 
of foreign companies in the classical activities of the electricity industry 
(generation, transmission and distribution). Alveal thus contends that the 
same determination to give a bold solution to the petroleum question was 
not observed in the electricity industry, mainly due to a coexistence pact 
with foreign capital that established a division of labor between energy-
producing and distribution activities in the electricity sector, permitting 
an accommodation between private and public interests in that industry 
(ALVEAL, 1994, p. 74). In the petroleum industry, these conditions were 
not present, paving the way for the nationalistic solution.
A final interpretation for Petrobras´ creation worth mentioning here 
was presented by the engineer Joao Lizardo de Araujo and by the economist 
Adilson de Oliveira. The authors contend that (ARAUJO & OLIVEIRA, 
2004, p. 24-25) Brazil’s process of industrialization and the ensuing 
development of a continental roads network faced the country with a 
considerable challenge, as the growth of oil imports would tend to press the 
country´s balance of payments, thus tending to limit economic growth. This 
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required the construction of an efficient domestic oil industry, with the statist 
solution imposing itself as the best solutionto organize the nascent industry. 
The authors argue that Petrobras´ creation led to a rationalization of efforts, 
the programming of exploration efforts, and a reduction of geological risk 
(IBID). After the monopoly was established and there was guarantee that 
competing companies would exploit no other basin, Petrobras could start 
to program its risks, “starting with the basins with greater prospects, and, 
progressively, exploring the others (IBID).” Hence, in the author´s view “the 
facts converged to the creation of Petrobras, [as] only the state monopoly was 
capable of reaching more rapidly the optimum scales of production”(IBID).
JAGUARIBE AND HIS LATER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE OIL 
QUESTION
After his first groundbreaking to the subject Jaguaribe would return to the 
oil question in other occasions (JAGUARIBE, 1974; 1977; 1989). This last 
section reviews them while locating them in their historical context. It is 
argued that Jaguaribe´s relatively pragmatic stance in matters of economic 
development was well-equipped to deliver a valuable and timely diagnosis of 
the challenges that Brazil´s petroleum industry faced over the decades.
The crisis of the miracle and the oil question
In 1974, when the economic model of the military dictatorship was to a large 
extent established, Jaguaribe diagnosticated the main economic problems 
that Brazil was still facing in what he believed was still a stage of dependent 
development:
“[a style of] economic development through the predominant participation of 
large foreign companies in the strategic sectors of the manufacturing and capi-
tal goods industries (…) necessarily leads to the perpetuation and worsening of 
dependency. The simplest and most commonly used technological processes 
are quickly mastered by national companies. The most sophisticated and state-
of-the-art technological processes are increasingly under foreign control. For 
these and other reasons, foreign companies are developing at a level and pace 
incomparably higher than domestic ones (…). National companies are relegated 
to small and medium-sized businesses or to traditional, slow-growing, low-tech 
sectors.” (JAGUARIBE, 1974, pp. 70-71).
In that context, Jaguaribe (1974) underscores that only public national 
companies such as Petrobras were progressing forward. Nevertheless, for 
him it would be an illusion to believe that their growth would compensate 
for the “hypertrophy of foreign companies in the manufacturing and capital 
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goods sectors” (JAGUARIBE, 1974, p. 71), or that having set up those 
large public national companies would be enough to control the country´s 
productive system. Although Petrobras and other state companies provided 
basic inputs on which foreign companies depended, for them far more 
important resources were technology and appropriate state regulations, on 
which they already could count on. In that vein, Brazil´s public-controlled 
corporations would be in an unfavorable situation because “the goods and 
services offered by the Brazilian public companies to the industrial park of 
the country, under the control of multinationals, are supplied at extremely 
low prices, close to cost, [sometimes even] subsidized by the state (…) [as] 
is currently happening with oil and its derivatives” (IBID). Even though 
this was a bleak scenario, Jaguaribe did not defend the “suppression of 
multinationals” as for him it would be “feasible, within varying limits, to 
discipline such companies as to better adjust them to the national interest” 
(IBID). Furthermore, the author believed that peripheral countries could 
reinforce their domestic power through the implementation of domestic 
consortia or common markets. For Jaguaribe, a far more crucial step towards 
the overcoming of dependence would be “the creation of an alternative 
technological and organizational capacity” (IBID). He thus contended that:
“in order to acquire conditions for proper technological and organizational de-
velopment, it is necessary, on the one hand, to have a critical mass, in terms of 
human and material resources, which implies, again, for the peripheral coun-
tries, an effort of consortium and coordination. On the other hand, if there is a 
critical mass, it is essential to stimulate the development of science and technol-
ogy” (JAGUARIBE, 1974, p. 74).
In fact, like Jaguaribe probably would have favored, from the second half 
of the 1970s onwards, Petrobras started to accelerate the development of 
a domestic petroleum goods and services industry and to step up its own 
and this industry´s technological capacities. Faced by mounting balance of 
payment pressures after the first oil shock had considerably increased the 
country´s oil bill, Petrobras started to tackle with great seriousness its plan 
to raise domestic oil production through increased offshore exploration. 
As early as in the late 1970s the “calculus of public investment in Petrobras 
[was altered], (…) making the cost of technological innovation to explore 
the continental shelf financially viable in comparison to the import cost” 
(BROOKS & CURTZ, 2016, p. 44). This eventually would result in 
the development and utilization of growingly sophisticated technology 
to exploits Brazil´s Deep water oil reservoirs (IBID, pp. 43-4). By then, 
“Petrobras was forced to build a large network of national suppliers that 
could contribute to the development of its activities” (ZAMITH, 2001, p. 
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88). It started to use a nationalization system, thus replacing the import of 
priority products and seeking alternative suppliers. In that arrangement, 
Petrobras had much autonomy in decisions related both to technological 
and industrial aspects. As Randall reports,“if in 1957 Petrobras imported 
80% of its equipment and spare parts; by 1979, this was reduced to 20%.” 
(RANDALL, 1993, p. 88). By the mid-1980s, Brazil was thus able to reduce 
its imports of capital goods to one fifth, being able to save around $2.2 billion 
through its import substitution policy in 1984 (IBID). In the late 1980s, 
as a result of the incentives given to Brazilian manufacturers and due to a 
shortage of foreign exchange, domestic manufacturers were able to supply 
more than 90% of Petrobras´ necessities. Furthermore, Petrobras´ insistence 
on quality led to improvements in the capital goods industry:
“As a result of the sophistication of Petrobras´ requirement, its suppliers were 
more likely to have R&D and to purchase technology than the rest of the metal 
mechanical industry, which did not have to meet such stringent standards. New 
products were developed by 90.6% of Petrobras´ suppliers, compared to 77.8% 
of firms not supplying Petrobras. Petrobras´ suppliers generally used more mod-
ern methods and had fewer losses due to poor quality of raw materials, machines 
and equipment, and inadequate workers than firms not supplying Petrobras.” 
(RANDALL, 1993, p. 235-6)”.
As was seen, Jaguaribe also regarded as a possible solution to overcome 
the phase of dependent development the establishing of consortia with 
multinational companies, through the intelligent harnessing of their more 
abundant technological and financial resources. In that vein, Evans contends 
that the development of Brazil´s petrochemical industry during the 1970s 
and 1980s was “an archetypal example of alliance-building” (EVANS, 1979, 
p. 227). In 1973 Petrbras, through its subsidiary Petroquisa entered into 
the petrochemical business after a domestic private group –The Capuava 
Group – had pionereed this industri´s large scale-development some years 
before. Thus it assumed a crucial position in Brazil´s petrochemical usiness 
when it was clear that group lacked financial strength. Evans (1979) thus sees 
the “tripod” formed between Petrobras, multinationals and private domestic 
partners in the petrochemical business as a novel institutional arrangement 
in Brazil´s industrial structure, and as proof that the state was attempting to 
attenuate the economy´s foreign dependence through novel solutions.
The 1973 oil shock and Brazil´s oil question
In a 1977 paper (JAGUARIBE, 1977), Jaguaribe discussed the economic and 
socio-political implications of the 1973 oil shock. According to his analysis, 
the oil shock could lead either to a third World War, to the establishment of a 
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global regime under the shared direction of the superpowers, or to the radical 
restructuration of the flow of economic transactions and of the international 
system (JAGUARIBE, 1977, p. 658). For the author, the third possibility 
would be the most likely to happen. He contended that the oil shock had 
occurred a divide between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries 
where the former would export their modern goods and services at very 
high prices to the latter and import from them goods and primary services 
at much lower fares. In that context, the scock had dramatically changed 
exchange relations, as with the quadrupling of oil prices, major oil exporters 
would now be able to capture a much larger share of the global value-added. 
Jaguaribe was confident that the world trade solution for the oil crisis could 
be negotiated between its main protagonists, both major oil producers, the 
United States and the soviet bloc. For the author, the oil crisis could “open 
(…) up an exceptional opportunity for underdeveloped countries to make a 
decisive contribution (…) in the structuring of a new democratic and open-
world system, with the use and support of the mechanisms of the United 
Nations” (JAGUARIBE, 1977, p. 664). He also believed that “countries that 
are in an advanced stage of industrialization, such as Brazil and Mexico” were 
capable to contribute to the establishment of “a new, democratic and open 
world system” (IBID).
Indeed, when Brazil was hit by the first oil shock of 1973, it was already a 
consolidated industrial economy, with an industry that operated almost at full 
capacity (DORIA, 1976, p. 58). In the context of strong industrial growth, 
Brazil also had managed to increase its production´s technological content. 
For instance, Bonelli (1976) – who employed a growth-accounting approach 
and data for the period 1959-1970 for twenty-one manufacturing industries 
– found that 22 percent of the total output growth of all those industries was 
not explainable either by growth in the capital stock or increases of the labor 
force. The author interpreted the residual as representative of technological 
change, and for some industries – such as machinery, electrical equipment, 
and pharmaceutical - those residuals were especially high. 
When the oil crisis effectively hit Brazil, its immediate impact was an 
increase oil bill. Whereas Petrobras could import a barrel of oil (CIF) for 
an average US$2,07 in 1969, in 1974 it had to disburse US$12,50 for the 
same amount of oil (CARVALHO, 1977, p. 185). Thus, a growing oil bill 
was causing worryingly growing balance of payments problems. By then, 
Brazil´s frenetic pace of growth of the early 1970s had slowed down, while 
inflationary pressures had restarted. According to Boa Nova (1985, p. 131), 
those were early signs of the recession in which the country would land in the 
1980s. Thus, the military administration thus realized that it would have to 
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do a major effort of economic expansion in order to resolve Brazil´s external 
constraints. The diagnostic was that Brazil required a more aggressive 
strategy to overcome its external constraints, requiring it to improve its 
export base. In that context, the II PND, launched in 1974, emphasized the 
further substitution of capital goods imports and basic inputs such as basic 
inputs such as petroleum. According to Frieden (1991, p. 119-123):
“(…) The government made massive investments in activities that provide basic 
inputs to modern industry. The investment program was primarily carried out 
by parastatal enterprises, often in the form of such imposing “big projects” as 
the Itaipu, (…). Public enterprises´ share of gross fixed capital formation went 
from 20% in 1970 to 23% in 1974 and 29% in 1979 (….) [Another] major feature 
of the ´big projects´ period was a systematic network of subsidies and incentives 
to more advanced portions of private industry. (…) The investment programs of 
the 1970s would have virtually unthinkable without the availability of foreign 
finance. (…)”
Heavily relying on abundant external finance, the II PND thus “effectively 
ignored the constraints imposed on the economy by the emergence of 
domestic capacity limitations and the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973.” 
(BACHA, 1980, p. 22). As Dias and Quaglino explain, from 1974 onwards 
external lending started to sum an ever-larger share of Petrobras´ budget 
(DIAS & QUAGLINO, 1993). In particular, both the energy sector as a 
whole and the petroleum sector were thus important culprits of the debt 
crisis of the 1980s.
The crisis of the Brazilian state and the oil question
Jaguaribe would return to Brazil´s oil question by the end of the 1980s when 
he discussed the crisis of the Brazilian state, which he saw as a direct outcome 
of the economic policies implemented during the 1970s. Jaguaribe argued 
that the Brazilian state´s crisis was related to “an increasing structural and 
functional deterioration, (..) a loss of rationality, transparency, functionality, 
efficiency, and responsibility” (JAGUARIBE, 1989, p.11). At the root of the 
state´s crisis he also identified“a dysfunctional tendency to state hypertrophy 
(...) an immanent propensity on the part of all bureaucratic power, if not 
restrained by other forces, to expand (…) its own power” (IBID). Thus, in 
his view, even “the most successful public companies (such as Petrobras) 
acted as holdings of a private conglomerate, and multiplied the creation of 
subsidiaries, justifying them as vertical or horizontal integrations producing 
economies of scale”(IBID, p. 53). 
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This growth tendencies, according to Jaguaribe, had become worse 
during Figueiredo´s (1979-1985) and Sarney´s (1985-1990) administrations. 
The state insolvency problem would be characterized by “a structural 
imbalance between revenue and public dispatch” (IBID, p. 66). At the federal 
level, the financial crisis mainly refers to a “relative decline of gross taxation 
and, particularly, of net taxation” (IBID). He also related it to a policy of 
controlled prices by the government, which it implemented due to the 
existence of an“important multiplier effect that the price of infrastructural 
inputs and services has on the final composition of prices” (IBID). In that 
sense, “the federal government, in its continued (and misdirected) attempts 
to control inflation, has been systematically imposing on public companies 
operating in the infrastructure and basic sectors, prices below their cost level, 
also harming their competitiveness”.(ibid). This price gap was a difficulty 
that was also faced by the oil sector, both due to depressed fuel prices to a 
policy of subsidizing Brazil´s ethanol production. This pricing policy would 
not only lead to a deterioration of the quality of public services, but also to a 
decreased morale of the companies, and, ultimately, would force the Union 
into conceding more and more subsidies, eventually eroding its net revenue. 
(IBID, p. 65).
For Jaguaribe, the key to solving the country´s structural economic 
problems were substantial investments in social policy, infrastructure, energy, 
and scientific-technological development (IBID, p. 19). Nevertheless, within 
an inflationary context also characterized by high public deficits and elevated 
interest rates, these disbursements would be practically unviable and would 
tend to trigger a potentially out of control explosive hyperinflation. In that 
vein, Jaguaribe believes that there would be no other remedy than setting 
“in motion a drastic anti-inflationary policy” and to face “its inescapable 
recessive effects”, which he regarded as an “undeniable prerequisite for a 
major development and reform program” (IBID).
Another problem that Jaguaribe related to the state´s crisis was what 
he called “notarial corporatism”, which he related to a tendency by public 
companies´ unions – such as Petrobras´ and Eletrobras - to make unfair and 
excessive demands. Because those companies operated under monopoly or 
oligopolistic conditions and provided essential services to the population, 
those unions´ excessive demands would potentially be felt by the entire 
population (IBID, p. 22). As a side effect, consumers and society would 
blame the state – and not unions – for the abused suffered and become 
susceptible to embracing radical pro-market policies. 
For Jaguaribe, thus, the solution to control “notarial corporatism” and 
for the crisis of the state in general was “a prudent but firm policy of opening 
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inwards and outwards” (IBID). The process of opening up the economy 
inwards would entail “eliminating privileges and notary immunities, through 
the legal regulation of these services, the establishment of public controls 
that supervise, with the necessary powers, their convenient rendering and 
penalizing abuses” (IBID). By its turn, the process of outwards opening of 
the economy would require the flexibilization of state monopolies, such 
as petroleum, to investments by private investors. At this point Jaguaribe 
highlights that it was important that at a certain stage of the country´s 
economic history sectors that are key to economic development were 
subjected to public control, as was the case of oil & gas petroleum from the 
1950s to the 1970s. Moreover, in his view from 1940 to the 1960s the state 
had lacked regulatory and supervisory capacities, which justified certain 
reservations concerning foreign capital, “as well as the granting of public 
monopolies for the exploitation of certain sectors, as in the case of Petrobras” 
(IBID p. 102). However, in the context of the crisis of the 1980s, Jaguaribe 
advocates for a more modern and mature discussion about the importance 
of foreign capital in the Brazilian economy. Much of these reservations 
regarding foreign capitals, Jaguaribe contends, “have become obsolete (…) as 
Brazil today has ample capacity to regulate and supervise its economy” and 
because “the world (…) has become extremely integrated, economically and 
technologically, being generally counterproductive to isolation positions” 
(IBID). 
Nonetheless, Jaguaribe was not a radical adept of the free market 
solution, as he acknowledges that profitable companies, such as Petrobras, 
should not be privatized, although they should be removed from their former 
obsolete monopolistic condition. In conclusion, Jaguaribe calls upon “an 
intelligent policy to attract foreign capital, which will increase our general 
investment capacity and give us all the possible advantages of technological 
and managerial development.” In that context, “foreign investment, under 
conditions that are appropriate to the national interest, constitute, in 
addition to a development factor, decisive support for a policy of substantial 
external debt relief” (IBID, p. 102).
Jaguaribe’s diagnostic of the crisis of the state, and ultimately, of 
the factors that were retarding Brazil´s economic recovery, was a very 
pragmatic one, especially what concerns the role of private capital and the 
importance of a relatively conservative fiscal consolidation path. He had 
the same pragmatic stance towards the oil question. As a matter of fact, 
some thirty years after the publication of “O Nacionalismo na atualidade 
brasileira” (JAGUARIBE, 1958) the author still believed that under certain 
circumstances foreign capitals could play an important role in the petroleum 
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sector. With his analysis, Jaguaribe competently anticipated what was to come 
during the nineties, when Petrobras´ monopoly was flexibilized (1995), and 
when a new regulatory framework was created for that sector in 1997, with 
the Petroleum Law. Nevertheless, as Jaguaribe recommended, Petrobras was 
never privatized, although in several occasions rounds of equity underwriting 
were undertaken. In industry, there is a relatively widespread view that the 
flexibilization of Petrobras´ monopoly was, in fact, an important step for 
the discovery of the pre-salt layer. The finding of the pre-salt was probably 
Brazil´s most important developmental event in the 21st century, and it has 
created the hope that the country may develop itself on a more sustainable 
basis. Although there have been some important drawbacks in recent years, 
Petrobras is still an important developmental tool, as Jaguaribe probably 
would have recommended it. 
CONCLUSIONS
The publication of Hélio Jaguaribe’s 1958 book (JAGUARIBE, 1958) 
triggered considerable debate in Brazil’s developmental circles. Due to his 
positions on Brazil’s oil question, which were considered inadmissible by 
some of the nationalists, it caused a breach at ISEB, one of Brazil’s most 
important economic and political think tanks, with Jaguaribe’s resignation. 
In this article, it has been argued that his contribution did not intend to 
question the nation´s choice of granting Petrobras’s with an oil & gas E&P 
monopoly, but to frame that debate in a much more a pragmatist and 
realistic base. Jaguaribe had shown that if Brazil had sovereignly chosen the 
monopoly option, it would have to deal with its consequences, as Brazil’s 
economic, financial and technological were clearly not unlimited. Having 
chosen that solution, it would not be possible for Brazil to rule out foreign 
investments in other sectors of the economy. Because the catching up 
strategy Brazil was pursuing was very accelerated, dangerous bottlenecks that 
could lead to balance of payments problems could only be avoided if Brazil 
supplemented its domestic savings with foreign capitals from MNCs.
Jaguaribe’s ground breaking contribution to the oil question – from 
a genuinely developmentalist standpoint and with much more analytical 
and technical rigor than the countless more journalistic articles on the 
subject during the 1950s – was one of the very first ones of an important 
debate among economists, sociologists and political scientists on Brazil´s 
oil question. Some of the authors were responding directly to him, such as 
Monteiro (1963) and Cohn (1968), while his contribution likly influenced 
others. Although Jaguaribe´s contributions had analytical flaws, as shown 
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by Cohn (1968) mainly what concerns the analysis of the mechanism that 
led to the solution of Brazil´s oil question, its influence on this debate is 
undeniable.
In the decades that followed, Jaguaribe would return to the oil question 
other times, one in the context of the “Brazilian miracle’s” mid-1970s 
crisis, one in the context of the oil shock, and another when Brazil was still 
facing the consequences of the 1980s debt crisis. Jaguaribe’s realistic and 
pragmatist stance was highly perceivable, in all these contributions but he 
never abandoned his developmental convictions. Jaguaribe´s views on the 
crisis of the state likely influenced Bresser-Pereira´s initiatives to reform 
the state during the 1990s, which had consequences in the petroleum 
industry through the foundation of ANP in 1997. If Jaguaribe, on one 
hand, never ruled out the participation of MNCs in Brazil’s economic 
life, he also made clear that for him an autonomous developmental policy 
focusing on the accumulation of human capital, human wellbeing, and 
technological capacities was the key to Brazil’s economic success. Even when 
the winds of liberalization, privatization and deregulation started to reach 
Brazil, Jaguaribe acknowledged that Petrobras as a public company had an 
important role to play in the country’s developmental plans.
Helio Jaguaribe’s legacy in the realm of the study of Brazil’s oil question 
still resonates today. Even though one and a half-decade of energy-based 
developmental plans have seemingly been dismissed, Jaguaribe’s proposals 
are still timely. Brazil is no longer in the position to rule out foreign oil & gas 
investments, but the key to Brazil’s endeavor still lays in the accumulation 
of technological capacities and social expenditures, both to be financed with 
oil & gas revenues. This is a critical juncture in which a liberal economic 
policymaking approach irresponsibly wants to use Brazil´s petroleum 
windfall profits to reduce Brazil’s short-term debt, in sharp discordance with 
the recommendations of an enormous resource-based economic growth 
literature (see for instance BARBIER, 2007). The rereading of Jaguaribe´s 
works on the subject not only shows that this approach will probably result 
in a missed opportunity but also helps to find ways forward. 
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